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other probable explanation for the occurrence before a court will apply
the doctrine, it seems that the third element is merely a reiteration of
this basic requirement, but specifically directed at the plaintiff's acts.
Once the plaintiff satisfies the court that there is no other explanation
for the occurrence, the third element has been satisfied and contributory
negligence is not a bar to the application of res ipsa loquitur.
JOHN L. REITER
Criminal Law: Involuntary Confessions-The petitioner was
found guilty of robbery in the Superior Court of Spokane County,
Washington, after a trial during which the court admitted, over ob-
jection, the petitioner's written and signed confession. The petitioner's
uncontradicted testimony was that the confession was made 16 hours
after his arrest, during which time his requests to call his wife and
attorney were denied. He stated that he was repeatedly told that he
would not be allowed to call until he "co-operated" with the police and
gave them a signed confession. Throughout this period the petitioner
was not advised of his right to remain silent, warned that his state-
ments might be used against him, or told of his rights respecting con-
sultation with an attorney. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction holding that the issue of the voluntariness of petitioner's
confession had been properly submitted to the jury.-
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction by a vote
of five to four.2 In the opinion written by Mr. Justice Goldberg, the
Court held that the confession was coerced and thus violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court found that the confession was obtained in an at-
mosphere of substantial coercion and did not meet the requisite test
for admissibility into evidence of being made "freely, voluntarily, and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort." 3 The Court said:
Confronted with the express threat of continued incommuni-
cado detention and induced by the promise of communication
with and access to family, Haynes understandably chose to make
and sign the damning written statement; given the unfair and
inherently coercive context in which made, that choice cannot be
said to be the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained will
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 (Emphasis added.)
Starting with McNabb v. U.S.,5 the Court made clear its intention
to review cases of coerced confessions using two distinct and separate
standards of admissibility, depending on their jurisdictional origin.
'Hayes v. State of Washington, 58 Wash. 2d 716, 364 P. 2d 935 (1961).
2Haynes v. State of Washington,-U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1336 (1963).
3 Wilson v. U.S., 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896).
4 Haynes v. State of Washington, supra note 2, at 1343.
5318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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When faced with the admissibility of confessions arising in the federal
court system, the Court need not resort to the due process clause to
refuse coerced confessions' admission into evidence. The Court made
reference to its broad jurisdiction over the federal courts and its power
to establish standards of procedure and evidence within the federal court
system. The Court stated:
In the view we take of the case, however, it becomes unnecessary
to reach the Constitutional issue pressed upon us. For, while the
power of the Court to undo convictions in state-courts is limited
to the enforcement of 'those fundamental principles of liberty
and justice'6 which are secured by the fourteenth amendment,
the scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought here
from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment of con-
stitutional validity.7
Thus in the McNabb case, the Court held that the admission into evi-
dence of a confession made when the prisoner was being held incom-
municado was a violation of the federal rule of admissibility. In Mallroy
v. U.S.," the Court reiterated its policy and said that it was enforcing
Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires
an officer making an arrest to bring the arrested person "without un-
necessary delay" before the nearest available commissioner. The Court
in explaining its position said:
In order adequately to enforce the congressional requirement of
prompt arraignment it was deemed necessary to render inadmis-
sible incriminating statements elicited from defendants during a
period of unlawful detention. 9
In the Mallroy case the Court found no necessity to define what would
be a violation of due process in this area, since it could exclude any
confession which was obtained as a result of such unnecessary delay on
the grounds that it was the final arbiter as to proper evidence in the
federal courts.
The first reversal of a state conviction involving the admission into
evidence of a coerced confession took place in the case of Brown v.
Missi sippi.10 There the Court held that the use of physical torture
to extort a confession was not consonant with due process be-
cause it violated "fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Since
that time, the Court has reversed the convictions of prisoners who were
subjected to the so-called "third degree" by holding that confessions
obtained through these methods were a violation of due process. The
decisions concerning the effect of the due process clause on the ad-
6 Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
7 McNabb v. U.S., supra note 5, at 340.8 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
9 Id. at 453.
10297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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missibility of confessions in state courts can basically be divided into
three categories.
1) Confessions extorted by physical torture
Where there has been physical abuse to the body of the prisoner,
the Court has invariably found the admission of the resulting confession
into evidence a violation of due process. In Stein v. N.Y., the Court
stated:
Physical violence or threat of it by the custodian of a prisoner
during detention serves no lawful purpose; invalidates confes-
sions that otherwise would be convincing and is universally con-
demned by law. When present, there is no need to weigh or
measure its effects on the .will of the individual victimn
2) Confessions extorted by extreme psychological coercion
Where the Court has found extreme cases of psychological coercion,
it has held as a matter of law that there was a violation of due process,
without examining the effect of these tactics on the individual pris-
oners. Threats of mob violence,1 2 deprivation of food and drink, 3 ex-
tended relay questioning by police officers,'14 and incommunicado deten-
tion for excessive periods of time,'5 have all been held, as a matter of
law, to be "inherently coercive." In these cases, the Court has found
the police methods so shocking to the concept of fundamental fairness
and justice that there has been no need to examine the effect of the use
of these tactics on the prisoner making the confession to see whether
he was "in fact" coerced. Thus in this area the Court has concentrated
on the techniques used by the police rather than on their subjective
effect on the prisoner.
3) Confessions obtained through general coercion
The majority of cases have arisen from situations where the police
have used various methods to coerce the prisoner to confess which are
more subtle than the aforementioned tactics but still calculated to induce
the prisoner to confess. In these cases, the Court felt that it was nec-
essary to evaluate the facts and determine whether or not under the
totality of circumstances the confession was involuntary "in fact."
Some of the factors which the Court has considered in deciding whether
the confession was voluntary have been the defendant's age, 6 his pre-
vious criminal record,' delay in arraignment, 8 lack of aid by counsel,' 9
11346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953).
12 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
'3 Paynes v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
'1 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
15 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
16 Note 12 supra.
'1 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
'8 Stein v. N.Y., supra note 11.
19 Crooker v. California, 337 U.S. 433 (1958).
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and failure to advise the accused that his statements might be used
against him. 20 The following test has been set down by the Court:
The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the circum-
stances of pressure against the power of resistance of the per-
son confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak of
will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced
criminal. 21
The use of this subjective test, however, creates a problem of deter-
mining at what stage the confession will be deemed involuntary "in
fact." This involves a determination by the Court as to when the pris-
oner is in such a psychological state of mind that his confession can
no longer be considered voluntary. Prior to the Haynes case, a con-
fession was held involuntary if the will of the prisoner was subdued
and no longer operative in making the decision to confess. The coercion
must have been the true cause of the confession. The requirement for
involuntariness was that the prisoner "had so lost his freedom of action
that the statements made were not his."2 In other words, the coercive
tactics of the police and the personality makeup of the prisoner must
have been such that the will of the prisoner would have been overborn
so that he could not have resisted, and a confession would have been
a necessary consequence.
In the Haynes case, however, the facts are insufficient to support
a holding that the confession was involuntary under a test which re-
quires that the prisoner's will 'be so overborn that he could not resist
the coercion. The two relevant facts in this case are: (1) the threat of
incommunicado detention, (2) the refusal to allow the prisoner to see
his counsel. The dissent makes it clear that never have such meager
facts supported a reversal on the grounds of due process. Apparently,
the Court has decided to broaden the requirements for the admissibility
of confessions by insisting that the entire decision making process be
free from coercive elements. This means that even when the effect of
the coercive tactics are not such that the prisoner's will to resist is over-
born, if the coercion leads the prisoner to make a rational and willful
decision to confess which he would not have made if not for the co-
ercion, the confession will be deemed involuntary. The dissent em-
phasizes this point by criticizing the majority for adopting a standard
of admissibility which would hold a confession involuntary if the police
had ". . . wrung from him [the prisoner] a confession he would not
otherwise have made. '23 It thus seems that the crucial question in de-
termining the voluntariness of a confession is whether or not the "at-
tendant circumstances" which the accused is entitled to have considered
20 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
21Stein v. New York, supra note 11, at 185.
22Lisenbia v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).
23 Haynes v. State of Washington, supra note 2, at 1349.
19631
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in determining voluntariness are of such a nature that they have im-
peded his freedom to decide whether or not he wishes to confess. Ac-
cording to this standard, a confession will apparently be held voluntary
only when the prisoner chooses to confess on the basis of his own mo-
tives. The test now used by the Court favors a more objective standard
and lends itself to clearer guidelines in distinction to the prior standard.
Although, in this case, the Court has not yet fully applied the
McNabb rule, which forbids the use of confessions that are made as a
result of incommunicado detention, it may have accomplished a similar
result by its change in policy.14 Incommunicado detention would seem
to be a relevant and pressing factor in determining whether the will of
the defendant had been affected. It must, however, be noted that in the,
Haynes case, aside from the incommunicado detention, there was a
threat of indefinite detention and a failure to notify the prisoner of his
right to remain silent.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the ultimate test of
the admissibility of a confession is not whether the confession was
induced by threats or promises, but whether under the circumstances it
was testimonially trustworthy.2 5 There is no question that this standard
is not the law today, and if it were applied in a case where there was
substantial coercion involved, the conviction would be reversed after
a petition of habeas corpus to the federal court. The United States
Supreme Court specifically overruled the test of "testimonial trust-
worthiness" as the sole criterion for admissibility in the case of Rogers
v. Richmond.26 The most probable reason for the longevity of this rule
in Wisconsin is that the cases which have arisen have not contained
sufficient' coercive elements to support a review by the United States
Supreme Court.
In considering the effect on police interrogation methods of the
Haynes decision and the general trend toward the McNabb rule, there
seems little doubt that the Court is attempting to stop secret interroga-
tion by police before arraignment. In the Haynes case the Court ex-
pressly stated:
We cannot blind ourselves to what experience unmistakably
teaches; that even apart from the express threat, the basic tech-
niques present here-the secret and incommunicado detention
and interrogation-are devices adapted and used to extort con-
fessions from suspects.1
7
24 Two recent law review articles have expressed the belief that in the near
future the Court will extend the McNabb rule to the states. Ritz, Twenty-
Five Years of State Crininal Confessions in the United States Supreme
Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 202 (1962); Broeder, Wong Sun v. United
States-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483 (1963).
25 Kiefer v. State, 258 Wis. 47, 44 N.W. 2d 537 (1950).
26 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
27 Haynes v. State of Washington, supra note 2, at 1343.
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Some authorities have felt that the result of these decisions will be
a serious impairment of police effectiveness to solve crimes which could
have been solved with a few hours of police interrogation.2 Those
who argue in support of the Court's position feel that the sacrifice in
police efficiency is a necessary evil which must be endured if individual
freedom and liberty are to be protected against police tyranny. 9 It
would seem desirable that a complete clarification of the law be forth-
coming from the Court so that there would be a definite uniform stand-
ard which could be followed throughout the states.
AARON TWERSKI
Trade Regulations: The Applicability of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act to Bank Mergers-In United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank,' the Supreme Court held, in a case of first impression, that section
7 of the Clayton Act is applicable to bank mergers. The Philadelphia
National Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank, the second
and third largest commercial banks with main offices in the metropolitan
area of Philadelphia, sought to merge into one consolidated bank. If
such a merger had succeeded, the resulting bank would have been the
largest in the immediate Philadelphia area. However, as soon as the
banks had secured approval of such merger from the Comptroller of
the Currency,2 the government brought suit under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.4 The Court then enjoined
the proposed merger agreement, holding that section 7 of the Clayton
Act applied to bank mergers, and that the anti-competitive effects of
the proposed merger violated its provisions.5
2ssymposium--Law and Police Practice; Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of
Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1957). Professor
Inbau also criticizes the Court for usurping a function which does not be-
long to them-that of passing over proper police practices. That in truth, this
is what the Court is doing can be seen from the majority decision in the
Haynes case where Mr. Justice Goldberg said that the Court was passing on
proper and permissable police tactics.
29 Symposion-Law and Police Practice; Liebowitz, Safeguards in the Law of
Interrogation and Confession, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 86 (1957).
'-U.S.-, 83 Sup. Ct. 1715 (1963).
2The Comptroller's approval of such agreement is required under 73 STAT.
462 (1959), 12 U.S.C. §215 (Supp. 1963). Such approval in turn may not be
given under the BANK MERGER Acr of 1960, 74 STAT. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.
1828(C) (Supp. 1960), until the Comptroller has received reports from the
Attorney General, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on the probable effects of
the proposed transaction on competition.226 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1 (Supp. 1960).
438 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958).
5 The Sherman Act issue was never reached in this case, due to the fact that
the majority based its decision on §7 of the Clayton Act. It should be noted,
however, that in dicta the Court considered §1 of the Sherman Act to be
applicable to bank mergers, and that Justice Goldberg, in his dissent, felt
that there was a strong Sherman Act issue in the case. See Note, 75 HARV.
L Rnv. 757, 759 (1962) for a discussion of this question.
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